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IS “VITAL MOTION” A HALAKHIC CONCEPT?
Ira Bedzow, Noam Stadlan, John Loike *
Abstract: In this article, the authors analyze the Talmudic and
halakhic sources upon which the concept of “vital motion” is based so
as to evaluate whether the sources support the concept. Through this
analysis, the authors present the view that vital and non-vital motion
are not distinct halakhic categories. Rather, physical or physiological
activity is understood in context as either meaningful or not, depending
on whether it is assumed that the person or animal will continue living
or not.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the Jewish tradition, the main definition of life is ensoulment
or possessing the spirit of life (nishmat ruach). 1 Death, therefore, is
defined as occurring when the soul or life force (nefesh) leaves the
body. Examples of this definition being used even in a juridical sense
can be found in two different passages in the Mishna. In the first
passage, the Mishna states, “He who closes the eyes of a yetziat nefesh
[a person whose soul is departing] is a spiller of blood.” 2 In the second
passage, the Mishna states, “A person does not defile [as a corpse] until
his soul departs.” 3 However, because a person’s soul or life force is a
spiritual entity, its departure cannot be empirically observed or
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1 See Genesis 7:22, BT Yoma 85a.
2 Mishna Shabbat 23:5.
3 Mishna Ohalot 1:6.
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clinically assessed. 4 Therefore, halakhic decisors had to determine
how they might be able to draw the demarcation line between life and
death based on physical and/or physiological conditions, 5 since “a
judge has only what his eyes see.” 6
The difficulty with relying on physical conditions to determine
metaphysical events is demonstrated in the following Talmudic
example: The Mishna states, “If a zav, a zava, a niddah, or a woman
after childbirth has died, they still impart impurity to objects on which
they are lying or upon which they are riding until their flesh has
decayed.” 7 The Talmud expands on this Mishna to explain the
impurity to which the Mishna refers is not the impurity of a corpse.
Rather, it is the ritual impurity, unique to a zav(a) and a menstruating
woman, where if they sit on an item, even one that cannot become
ritually impure, and beneath that item is a vessel, the vessel becomes
ritually impure through their sitting on the item above it. The
implication is that, for the sake of this form of ritual impurity, these
three types of people are considered to still be alive until their flesh
decays. The reason for this is due to the fear that the person might
simply have fainted, and be mistakenly taken for dead. 8 Yet, if the
person’s flesh has started to decay, then it is clear that they are in fact
dead. 9 Rabbi Moshe Sofer explains that the sages instituted this decree
because the sages understood that people can only recognize that death
has occurred given their expertise in identifying signs that a person’s
physical constitution has changed. For those who are inexperienced in
detecting signs of life, physical decomposition was the best indication
they had to recognize that the person had died. For those who are more
experienced, other signs could be relied upon, such as a heartbeat and
respiration.

4 See Bleich, J. David, Establishing Criteria of Death, in TRADITION: A JOURNAL OF
ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 90-113 (vol. 13.3) (1973) (“The traditional view is that death
occurs upon the separation of the soul from the body. Of course, the occurrence of this
phenomenon does not lend itself to direct empirical observation.”).
5 The terms, physical and physiological, both refer to bodies; however, physical refers
to the body itself while physiological refers to the body’s functions.
6 BT Bava Batra 131a.
7 Mishna Niddah 10:4.
8 Id. See the alternative position of Rabbi Eliezer in the Talmud, who states that these
people impart ritual impurity only until the belly of the corpse bursts. The former position
only applies in cases where the corpse resembles a person who has fainted. In other words,
once the corpse is clearly no longer alive, it no longer imparts this type of ritual impurity.
9 Resp. Hatam Sofer, YD, no. 338.
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Currently, debate among halakhic decisors regarding what
signifies death based on physical and/or physiological conditions has
become entrenched between two main positions. One position holds
that irreversible termination of respiration is a definitive signifier that
a person has died, and this can be determined by neurological criteria. 10
The other position holds that irreversible termination of cardiac
activity, or irreversible cessation of vital motion, is the definitive
signifier that a person has died. 11 In this article, we will examine the
Talmudic and halakhic sources upon which the concept of “vital
motion” is based so as to evaluate whether the sources support this
concept. This evaluation does not appraise the scientific or
philosophical notion of vital motion; rather, it only tests whether it has
juridical warrant according to the authoritative sources of Jewish law.
Through this analysis, we intend to show that vital and non-vital
motion are not distinct halakhic categories. Rather, physical or
physiological activity is understood in context as either meaningful or
not, depending on whether it is assumed that the person or animal will
continue living or not.
II.

DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION OF VITAL AND NON-VITAL
MOTION

A major proponent of defining the presence of life through the
presence of “vital motion,” is Rabbi J. David Bleich. Rabbi Bleich
writes, “[I]t is not the mere presence of the heart or the function of the
heart as a unique organ which is the essential indicator of life, but
rather the ‘movement’ of the heart as a form of integrated, vital
movement of the organism which indicates that life is present…” 12
Rabbi Bleich derives his notion of “vital motion,” and therefore his
concept of non-vital motion which he identifies as pirkus, from his

10 This is the position of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and R. Gedalia
Dov Schwartz among others.
11 This is the position of Rabbi J. David Bleich, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rabbi
Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss, Rabbi Shmuel ha-Levi Wosner, and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg among
others. However, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach held that if every cell in the brain were
definitively dead, the patient should be considered dead.
12 J. David Bleich & Arthur J. Jacobson, JEWISH LAW AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 308
(2015).
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understanding of the Mishna in Ohalot 1:6 and of the commentary of
Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (Rashi) 13 in BT Yoma (85a).
The Mishna in Ohalot states:
A person does not defile [as a corpse] until his soul
departs. Even if he is cut up or even if he is about to
die, he [still] makes levirate marriage obligatory and
exempts from levirate marriage, he feeds [his mother]
terumah and disqualifies [his mother] from eating
terumah. Similarly, in the case of cattle or wild
animals, they do not defile until their souls depart. If
their heads have been cut off, even though they are
moving convulsively (mefarksim), they are unclean,
like a lizard’s tail which moves convulsively
(mefarkeset) 14
According to Rabbi Bleich, the Mishna in Ohalot distinguishes
between two types of movement, namely, movement that indicates life,
i.e. vital motion, and that which does not, i.e. pirkus. Convulsive
movement, or pirkus, is that type of bodily movement that occurs after
decapitation. Such movement cannot be indicative of life, since the
Mishna states that the decapitated animal is unclean, which by
definition implies that it is considered dead. However, by mentioning
that pirkus is not indicative of life, Rabbi Bleich infers that there must
be another category of movement that does indicate continued life. He
writes:
It is evident that the Mishnah seeks to differentiate
between two types of movement; movement which is
devoid of vital significance, and movement which is
indicative of life. The residual movement of a
decapitated person or animal is described as a mere
spasm and hence not indicative of life; the inference
being that other forms of movement are indeed
indicative that life is still present. 15

13 Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (1040 –1105), was a medieval French rabbi and author of a
comprehensive commentary on the Bible and Talmud. See JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/rabbi-shlomo-yitzchaki-rashi (last visited Mar. 20,
2020).
14 Mishna Ohalot 1:6.
15 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/4

4

Bedzow et al.: Is “Vital Motion” a Halakhic Concept?

2020

IS “VITAL MOTION” A HALAKHIC CONCEPT?

7

In his view, the Mishna needed to identify the status of pirkus
as an exception so as to affirm the underlying presumption that bodily
movement is indicative of life.
Rabbi Bleich utilizes his distinction between vital and non-vital
motion to explain Rashi’s commentary on the passage in BT Yoma
85a. The passage in Yoma is as follows:
The Rabbis taught: [If, on Shabbat, a person is buried
under rubble,] until what point does one check [to
clarify whether the victim is still alive? They said: One
clears] until [the victim’s] nose. And some say: [One
clears] until [the victim’s] heart…Rav Pappa said: The
dispute [with regard to how far to clear the rubble to
check for signs of life applies when the digger begins
removing the rubble] from below [starting with the feet]
to above. But [if one cleared the rubble] from above to
below, once he checked as far as [the victim’s] nose he
is not required [to dig further,] as it is written: “All in
whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life”
(Genesis 7:22). 16
Rashi comments, clarifying the question, “until what point does
one check [to clarify whether the victim is still alive?],” as follows: “if
the person resembles a dead person in that he does not move his limbs.”
Rashi is providing a visual depiction of the scene. If the person is lying
motionless, he may still be alive, and one should check in order to see
if one can still save him or not. Rabbi Bleich, however, formalizes the
explanation to support his distinction between vital and non-vital
movement. He writes:
Thus, there arises a need for a distinction between
motion which is a veridical criterion of life and mere
pirkus, or convulsive movement, which is not a sign of
vital animation. Accordingly, Rashi comments that
other criteria of death assume significance only if the
victim or patient appears to be dead as evidenced by the
fact that ‘he does not move his limbs’ because, in the
case of a person who has not been decapitated, bodily
movement, in and of itself, is an absolute sign of
vitality. 17
16
17

BT Yoma 85a.
3 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS, 182 (1989).
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Rabbi Bleich’s reading of Mishna Ohalot serves a justificatory
support for his understanding of Rashi’s comment in BT Yoma 85a.

III.

HALAKHIC SOURCES THAT QUESTION WHETHER PIRKUS IS A

NOVEL HALAKHIC CONCEPT

As seen above, according to Rabbi Bleich, “pirkus” as nonvital or convulsive movement connotes movement of a body part that
has been separated from the body, implying that all bodily movement
by a person whose body is still intact indicates “an absolute sign of
vitality.” 18 However, the Talmudic and halakhic literature does not
always seem to support this view. There are instances in the Talmud,
where a person or animal displays bodily movement, yet is nonetheless
declared as dead. There are also instances where the Talmud
specifically uses the word “pirkus” yet the Talmudic discussion
concludes that the person or animal is still very much alive. Given
these examples, “pirkus” should not necessarily be viewed as a strict
halakhic category. Rather, the term may be seen simply as describing
convulsive movement, which is then deemed either indicative of
continued life or mere spasmatic movement depending on context.
A.

Examples Where Bodily Movement Is Not An
Absolute Sign Of Vitality

In the passage in BT Hullin 21a, the sages attempt to determine
when to establish that a given person or animal begins to impart ritual
impurity, which arises contemporaneously with the person’s or
animal’s death. 19 These cases challenge the clear boundary lines
between life and death, since they are cases where the person or animal
imparts ritual impurity even when they show signs, i.e. movement, that
may seem to indicate life. The passage reads as follows:
Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says [that] Rabbi Yohanan
says: If one ripped [a person] like [one cuts] a fish,
18

Id.
BT Hullin 21a. The comparisons between humans and animals in these discussions
demonstrate that even while the Jewish tradition maintains that humans are qualitatively
different than animals, death for both humans and animals occurs in the same ways.
19
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[lengthwise, he] imparts impurity in a tent. Rabbi
Shmuel bar Yitzhak says: And [that is specifically if he
was ripped] from his back. Shmuel says: If one
rendered [the animal like] a shard [gistera] [by cutting
it in two widthwise, its halakhic status is that of] an
unslaughtered carcass [nevelah]. Rabbi Elazar says: If
the thigh [the hind leg of the animal] was removed and
its recess is obvious, it is an unslaughtered carcass
[nevelah]. What are the circumstances of its recess
being obvious? Rava said: [It is] any [situation] where
[the animal] is collapsed [and even so its hind leg] is
visibly lacking. 20
Rashi comments on the phrase, “imparts impurity in a tent,”
that this is the case, even if the person is still moving (mefarkes). 21 In
this example, though the person’s back has been severed lengthwise,
his body remains intact. According to Rabbi Bleich’s understanding
of Rashi’s comment from Ohalot, the person’s movement should be “a
veridical criterion of life” and not “mere pirkus.” However, Rashi
explicitly uses the term “pirkus” to explain the intact body’s
convulsions after the person has been declared dead. Similarly,
Maimonides rules, “If [a person’s] backbone is broken together with
most of the surrounding flesh, he was torn apart like a fish from his
back, he was decapitated, or he was cut in half from his stomach, he
imparts impurity, even though some of his limbs are still making
convulsive movements (merafref b’echad m’eivaraiv).” 22 Rabbi
Yaakov ben Asher 23 in the Tur, Rabbi Yosef Karo, and Rabbi Yechiel
Michel Epstein 24 seem to understand Maimonides and the Talmudic
passage in the same way, since they all write with respect to a person
who suffers one of these fatalities, “even though he is still alive, he is
considered as if dead.” 25 It cannot be the case that these rabbis are
proffering that one treat a person who is dying as if dead, since such a
suggestion would contradict the general Talmudic principle to value
20

Id.
Rashi, BT Hullin 21a, s.v. “metameh b’ohel.”
22 Hilkhot
Tumat
Met
1:15.
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1517151/jewish/Tumat-Met-Chapter-1.htm
23 Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher (1269-1343) was a well-known rabbi in the Holy Roman
Empire and Spain.
24 Rabbi Yechiel Michel ha-Levi Epstein (1829-1908) was a rabbi in Lithuania.
25 Tur/Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 370; Arukh Hashulhan, Yoreh Deah 370:1.
21
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life, no matter how much a person has left. It would also contradict
the explicit Halakha, found in the Shulhan Arukh (written by Rabbi
Yosef Karo), which states “one in a dying condition is considered a
living being in all respects … And whosoever closes [the dying
person’s] eyes before death [which may hasten death] is regarded as
one who sheds blood.” 26 One must, therefore, understand the meaning
of the phrase, “‘even though he is still alive, he is considered as if
dead,”‘ to mean that despite the fact that the person still shows
indications of life, as demonstrated by his convulsions, these situations
render a person to be deemed dead, and we should understand that any
movement they make is not halakhically significant. As such, in this
case, bodily convulsions, i.e. pirkus, have a different connotation than
the one in the Mishna in Ohalot. In Ohalot, pirkus describes movement
of a body part that was severed from the animal. Here, pirkus describes
movement of the person himself. In both cases, movement is deemed
not to be determinative of life, but it is not the pirkus itself – as opposed
to other “vital” motion – that establishes the ruling. Rather, it is how
the movement is understood within the greater context of the situation.
With respect to conceiving of “pirkus” as a halakhic category,
Maimonides’ ruling is interesting in two respects. First, his ruling does
not differentiate between bodily movements of a limb that has been
separated from the body or bodily movements of a corpse that is intact.
In all of these cases, bodily movement is not considered halakhically
significant to indicate continued life. Second, if “pirkus,” as non-vital
movement, were an established legal category, the term should be used
consistently so as to make explicit the legal ramifications in the event
that it occurs. However, Maimonides does not use the term, “pirkus,”
to describe the person’s bodily movements in this situation, even
though Rashi does. Rather, he uses the term “merafref.” 27 In the
Talmudic literature, the term “merafref” is not found with reference to
human convulsive movements. The term refers to the fluttering of a
bird’s wings, 28 or the ripples on the surface of milk on a plate. 29 With
respect to the fluttering of a bird’s wings, the Talmud explicitly likens
it to pirkus. 30 It therefore does have the connotation of convulsive
Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 339:1.
The term “merafref” is related to the term “yerofafu” in Job 26:11 (“The pillars of heaven
tremble [yerofafu] and are astonished at His rebuke.”).
28 Bereshit Rabbah 2:4.
29 Bereshit Rabbah 4:8.
30 BT Hullin 38b.
26
27
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movement, but it does not mean that these terms are formal legal
concepts. It is more likely that they are synonyms that describe similar
types of movements, though one may be more appropriate to use in
one situation over another.
The term “mefarper” rather than “merafref,” on the other hand,
is oftentimes used in the Talmud to refer to human convulsions that are
indicative of life at the moment but that death is inevitable and
imminent. Examples include the following:
“…The father of the boy[, i.e., the young priest who
was stabbed,] came and found that he was convulsing
(mefarper). He said: May [my son’s death] be an
atonement for you. But my son is still convulsing
(mefarper) [and has not yet died. Therefore,] the knife[,
which is in his body,] has not become ritually impure
[through contact with a corpse]….” 31
“The Sages taught, [regarding the verse ‘If one be found
slain in the land which Hashem your God has given you
to possess it, lying in the field’ (Deuteronomy 21:1):
‘Slain’ (hallal) [indicating one killed by a sword,] but
not one who was strangled (hanuk); ‘slain,’ (hallal) but
not [one who was found still] convulsing (mefarper).”32
“The Sages taught…: How does the court describe
testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the
witnesses: ‘Perhaps you saw this man about whom you
are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you
pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping
with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was
convulsing (mefarper). If you saw only this, it is as if
you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder,’
since your testimony is conjecture.” 33
Maimonides uses the term “mefarper” to connote just these
situations where death is inevitable and imminent, but the person is
still alive.34 As such, Maimonides’ use of the term “merafref” in the
BT Yoma 23a. https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.23a?lang=bi
BT Sotah 45b. https://www.sefaria.org/Sotah.45b?lang=bi
33 Sanhedrin 37b; Shevuot 34a.
34 See Hilkhot Rotzeah u’ Shmirat Nefesh 3:9, “Similarly, a person is liable for execution
… [if] he held his hand over a colleague’s mouth and nose until he left him [convulsing]
(mefarper), unable to live…the person who caused the victim’s death is executed; it is as if he
had strangled him by hand.” See id. at 9:11, “[Deuteronomy 21:1 states:] ‘[w]hen a corpse
31
32
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particular instance of the Halakha above may be a scribal error, in
which case one can assume the proper word should be “mefarper.”
Though, if this were true, then “mefarper” would not exclusively imply
that the person convulsing is still alive at the moment, which runs
contrary to the use of the term in the Talmud. Alternatively,
Maimonides may have intentionally chosen “merafref” instead of
“mefarper” to imply that the movements in the Halakha above are
seemingly indicative of life, yet are not absolute signs of vitality.
Rather, in the instance where a person’s backbone is broken together
with most of the surrounding flesh or he was torn apart like a fish from
his back, bodily movement should be seen in the same way as it is in a
case of decapitation, which is also included in Maimonides’ list, i.e. as
not halakhically relevant. This does not make “merafref” a specific
legal category for Maimonides, just as “pirkus” is not a specific legal
category for him. Both terms, whether they indicate movements of a
body part that is separated from the whole or movement of the whole
body itself, are simply synonyms for spasmatic movement, whose
halakhic implications should be interpreted in light of the context of
the situation.
The following is an example where pirkus is used to describe
bodily movement of humans, which may support Rabbi Bleich’s
understanding of “pirkus” as non-vital movement, yet it is not
necessary that it does so. The Talmud notes that once a child is born,
he inherits property from his mother if she dies. This statement implies
that a fetus does not inherit property. The reason that a fetus does not
inherit property is because it is presumed that a fetus will die in utero
before the mother dies, and a deceased son does not inherit property
from his mother or anyone else for that matter. The Talmud then
questions the presumption that a fetus will die in utero before the
mother dies by citing an incident where a woman died and then the
fetus made three spasmodic movements (pirkusi). Regarding these
movements, the Talmud cites Mar bar Rav Ashi, who states, “[j]ust as
(hallal) is found…’ Hallal, [the term used for corpse indicates a person slain with a sword,]
and not strangled to death, nor a person convulsing (mefarper); these are not implied by the
term hallal.” See also Hilkhot Sanherin 20:1, “A court does not inflict punishment on the
basis of conclusions which it draws, only on the basis of the testimony of witnesses with clear
proof. Even if witnesses saw a person pursuing a colleague, they gave him a warning, but then
diverted their attention, punishment is not inflicted on the basis of their testimony. Or the
followed the pursuer into a ruin, and they found the victim slain, yet in convulsing (mefarper),
and the sword dripping blood in the hand of the killer, since they did not see him strike him,
the court does not execute the killer based on this testimony.” Concerning this and the like,
Exodus 23:7 states: “Do not kill an innocent and righteous person.”
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with the tail of the lizard, which convulses (she’mefarkeset) [and the
movements do not indicate life for the tail, so with the movements of
the fetus.]” 35 However, it may be that Mar bar Rav Ashi was not
disregarding the convulsions of the fetus because he conceived of
pirkus as a halakhic category per se. Rather, he could have been
dismissing the particular pirkus of the fetus as being similar to the
particular pirkus of the lizard’s separated tail. In both instances, the
movement would be significant, were it not for other factors. For the
lizard’s tail, the factor is that it is no longer connected to a living
animal. For the fetus, the factor is that it cannot live independently
without the support of its mother until it is (about to be) born. This
analysis is in line with the position that the fetus is halakhically
considered to be a like the thigh of the mother, 36 which in this example
are both still attached.
B.

Examples Where “Pirkus” Is A Sign Of Vitality

In addition to the existence of Talmudic passages where bodily
movement, according to Rabbi Bleich’s understanding, should be seen
as a sign of vitality but nevertheless is not, there are also Talmudic
passages where the presence of “pirkus” does indicate that the animal
or person is still alive. For example, with respect to pirkus of animals,
the Mishna relates, “one who slaughters an impure animal for a gentile
and it is still twitching (mefarkeset), it can render impure with the
impurity of foods (tumat okhlin), 37 but not with the impurity of
carcasses (tumat nevelah) until it dies or until its head is chopped
off.” 38 The reason why it can render impure with the impurity of foods
(tumat okhlin) but does not have the status of nevelah is due to the
different legal prohibitions for Jews and non-Jews regarding eating
animals. At the moment of slaughter, the animal may not be eaten by
the Jew because it is not a kosher animal. For Jews, however, ritual
slaughter deems an animal to be dead, so that it may be eaten even if a
Jew is religiously prohibited to do so for kashrut reasons (i.e.
considered as food). For a non-Jew, the animal is prohibited because
it is still considered alive, and non-Jews are prohibited to eat live
BT Bava Batra 142b.
BT Hullin 58a.
37 Tumat Okhlin are contracted by food items that become ritually defiled by contact with a
dead body and can then defile other food and drink.
38 Mishna Taharot 1:4.
35
36
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animals according to Noahide law. In this example, pirkus is
halakhically significant as an indication that the animal is still alive,
albeit for the purpose of non-Jews’ observance of Noahide law. Based
on this, “pirkus” would not connote a legal category of “non-vital”
motion, since the movement is an indication that the animal is deemed
alive, at least according to Noahide law even if not according to
Halakha.
With respect to pirkus of fowl, the Talmud gives the following
ruling: If one trampled fowl with his foot, or threw it against a wall, or
if an animal crushed it, and it is convulsing (mefarkeset); if the animal
[remained alive] from the time of the injury until twenty-four hours
later, and a person then slaughtered it, it is kosher [provided no other
defect is found that would have caused it to die within twelve months,
which would render it a treifa]. Rabbi Elazar bar Yannai said in the
name of Rabbi Elazar ben Antigonus, “It requires examination [after
slaughtering, to make sure it does not have a defect that would render
it treifa]”. 39 Maimonides rules according to the anonymous
statement, 40 and Rabbi Karo rule according to Rabbi Elazar ben
Antigonus. 41 Yet, according to both Maimonides and Rabbi Karo, the
animals movements are not simply relegated as halakhically irrelevant.
Rather, in this instance, the fowl’s movement is an indication that it is
still very much alive, since the fowl may be slaughtered afterwards.
With respect to interpreting pirkus as a sign of vitality for
people, the Talmud states, “Why is it taught in a baraita: If one
unintentionally cut the two passageways of another person, or most of
the thickness of the two, he is not exiled? [The wound is definitely
fatal. Therefore, one who unintentionally wounds another in this
manner should be exiled. The Talmud answers: With regard to that
baraita,] Rav Hoshaya said: We are concerned that perhaps the wind
aggravated his condition and actually caused his death, in which case
the perpetrator is not culpable for the death and should not be exiled.
Alternatively, perhaps [the victim] hastened his own death.” 42 The
Talmudic discussion concludes by saying that the practical difference
BT Betzah 34a. See also BT Hullin 56a.
See Hilkhot Shechitah 9:20. Maimonides rules according to the anonymous statement
because it is an explicit Mishna.
41 Yoreh Deah 58:2. See also HALAKHAH. BACH. YOREH DEAH, SIMAN 58:2,
https://www.sefaria.org/Bach%2C_Yoreh_Deah.58.2.1?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en.
42 BT Yevamot 120b-121a. See also TALMUD. YEVAMOT DAF 120b.15, THE WILLIAM
DAVIDSON
TALMUD,
https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.120b.15?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en.
39
40
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between the two possibilities is either where someone cuts the victim’s
trachea and esophagus in a house of marble, which was closed on every
side so that there was no wind, and the victim convulsed (v’parkeis).
In this situation, the person’s convulsions (pirkus) might have hastened
his own death. On the other hand, in a case where someone cuts the
victim’s trachea and esophagus outside where there is wind, and the
victim did not convulse at all (v’lo parkeis), the wind may be seen as a
contributing factor to the person’s death. According to the reasoning
of the Talmudic discussion, convulsion (pirkus) is interpreted to
indicate that he person is still alive, for only then can the movement in
fact contribute to the person’s death. 43 In fact, Maimonides rules,
“Even if the killer severed the victim’s windpipe and esophagus, if the
victim remained alive for a short while, the killer is not exiled on his
accord. Therefore, it is only when the victim died without pirkus at all,
or was killed in a place that was not open to the wind - e.g., a closed
marble building, or the like - that the killer is exiled.” 44 Based on this
Talmudic passage and Maimonides’ ruling, pirkus in this case is an
indication that the person is still alive. It is not used as a halakhic
category which connotes non-vital movement.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article is not to dismiss the position that
cardiac activity and vital motion is a definitive signifier that a person
is still alive. We recognize that the debate this topic engenders has
become a disagreement for the sake of Heaven (machloket l’shem
Shamayim), 45 and the respective positions should be seen as words of
the Living God (divrei Elokim hayyim), 46 even if one position may
eventually become the main normative ruling in the future. 47 Nor have
the authors of this article sought to appraise the concept of vital motion
from a scientific or philosophical viewpoint. Rather, the authors’
43 BT Yevamot 121a. See also TALMUD. YEVAMOT DAF 121a. THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON
TALMUD, https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.121a.1-2?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en.
44 Hilkhot Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh 5:2. See also ROTZEACH USHMIRAT NEFESH - CHAPTER
FIVE.
(Trans.
by
Eliyahu
Touger),
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1088921/jewish/Rotzeach-uShmirat-NefeshChapter-Five.htm.
45 Mishna Avot 5:17.
46 BT Eruvin 13b.
47 Id.; see also BT Berakhot 36b, (which states, “u’Bet Shammai b’makom Bet Hillel, eino
mishna.”).
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objective was to evaluate the assumption that the halakhic concept of
vital motion can be inferred from the existence of a halakhic category
of non-vital motion, i.e. pirkus. Through our analysis of the relevant
authoritative sources of Jewish law, we believe that we have shown
that pirkus is not a distinct or exclusive halakhic category. Rather,
physical or physiological activity is understood in context as either
meaningful or not. This finding challenges the assumption that one
can infer the concept of “vital motion” from the concept of “pirkus.”
The concept of “vital motion” must therefore find different legal
support upon which it can rely for juridical justification.
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